INTRODUCTION
In an earlier work by Derman [1] , a finite state Non-terminating Markov Ratio Décision Process (abbreviated by NMRDP) was considered with the objective of maximizing the ratio ofrewards over an infinité planning horizon. It has been shown in this process that, an optimal policy is stationary and pure, and the value is unique. Fox [2] has provided an algorithm for Computing the solution in the context of an Undiscounted Markov Renewal Program (MRP) but it is applicable to the NMRDP also. Schweitzer [4] has described an itérative procedure for finding a solution of the MRP and has established that a simple data-transformation reduces any MRP or NMRDP into a discrete time Markov Décision Problem, which is equivalent in the sensé that it has the same state and policy spaces, and that every policy has the same long run average return per unit time.
In this paper, the finite state NMRDP is generalized to a game context resulting in a Non-terminating Stochastic Ratio Game (NSRG). This game is similar to the game of Hoffman and Karp [3] except that the payoff function is a ratio. Thus, the game proceeds in stages and at each stage, the game is in one of a finite number of states. Each of the two players observes the current state and then chooses an action from a finite number of alternatives of actions available in that particular state. The players' actions and the current state jointly détermine a set of two rewards and transition probabilities to the succeeding state. Thus, there are two séquences of rewards and the payoff function is the limiting ratio of the average rewards per stage over the infinité number of states.
In the stochastic games of Shapley [5] or Hoffman and Karp [3] , the game played at each stage is two-person zero-sum type. In NSRG, the game played in each stage is a ratio game. It is shown that the players have stationary optimal stratégies and the game has a unique value both of which are independent of the initial probability distribution. A convergent algorithm for Computing the solution is presented. It may be possible to generalize the data-transformation approach of Schweitzer [4] for MRP and NMRDP, to introducé datatransformations to reduce NSRG into a non-terminating stochastic game. However, the approach taken here is the generalization of Hoffman and Karp's algorithm [3] .
Both theoretical and practical aspects have motivated this work. The generalization considered, simultaneously, achieves also a generalization of MRP [2] to game context. Suppose two players control a MRP. Dependent on the state occupied by the process and the actions taken by the players, the process makes a transition after a random interval of time giving rise to a reward and the time taken for the transition. Thus the séquence of games gives rise to two streams, one of rewards and the other of time intervals respectively. The payoff function defined here is the limiting ratio of the sum of rewards to that of the time intervals. Clearly, NSRG developed in this paper solves the above generalization of MRP also. The generalization has also significance in practical situations of conflict. For example, consider two parties involved in a conflict that continues indefinitely, but may be in different levels or states. Dependent on the state and actions taken, two streams, one of gains and the other of losses, occur. Here the limiting ratio of the sum of gains to that of losses is of interest, and the generalization given in this paper solves this game.
The existence theorem and its proof given in this paper do not foliow from the works of Shapley [5] or Hoffman and Karp [3] . An entirely different approach is taken for pro ving the theorem.
DESCRIPTION OF NSRG
NSRG is a séquence of ratio games played in consécutive periods of equal intervais, where each pair of matrices for each ratio game is chosen from a finite set 5 consisting of AT pairs (A it B i} i = l, .. ., N) of matrices. If in a period, the ratio game is played with matrices (A it B t ), the game is said to be in state i (i= 1, ..., N). While in state i, Player ƒ has a finite set C t of K t alternatives numbered 1, 2, ..., k, ..., K t and similarly Player II has a set D t of L t alternatives numbered 1,2, ...,Z, ...,Z, f . Thus
It is assumed that JB £ > 0 (i= 1, .. ., JV).
The probabilities of transition to the successive states are given by pfj(i,jeS, keC it leDi), and since the NSRG is assumed to be non-terminating type,
It will be assumed that corresponding to any choice of actions by the players, the underlying Markov Chain is irreducible. That is, if mixed strategy vectors x t and y t are followed when the game is in state i, and Pijix,.y,)= E Ipgxfyi.
keCi leDi are the transition probabilities of a Markov Chain { X", n = 0, 1, ...}, then for any i and j, the probability that state; will ever be reached from the initial state i is 1. Now, in gênerai given that the game starts in a specified state i Q , the évolution ofNSRGcanbe représentée! by the séquence {i Bf A",S n },n = 0,1, . . .,whereï", A" and E n respectively are the state occupied and actions taken by the Players / and II at period n such that i n e S, A n e C in and E n e D t . If r io dénotes the payoff function for NSRG started in state i 0 , then
where A" and Z" are viewed as vectors.
RESULTS OF NMRDP
An NMRDP is a special case of NSRG in which the second player is a "dummy" being allowed a fixed strategy in each of the JV states. An optimal solution of NMRDP has been characterized by Derman [1] 
EXISTENCE OF MINIMAX SOLUTION FOR NSRG
Let T be the set of all possible stratégies available to Player / which are generated by the sets C t (i=l, .. ., IV). Let I(Icï) dénote the set of all stationary stratégies available to Player/, where xeX is an JV-tuple of probability vectors such that
Let the corresponding sets for Player // be, 1/ the set of all stratégies; and F(F<= (7) the set of all stationary stratégies among them.
Let r a (t, u) dénote the ratio for the NSRG starting with an initiai probability vector, a, when Players I and ƒ/ follow te<T and we U stratégies respectively. For a fixed strategy y e F for Player //, Player 1, if 'y is known to him» faces a Markov Ratio Décision process and the maximal value of this problem is: r B (y)=Maxr a (t,j0.
teT Following Derman [1] and Fox [2] , it has a stationary optimal solution which is independent of the initial state. Therefore, r a (j;)=Maxr a (x, y)
xeX =r(y).
where r (y) can be obtained as the value of a linear program which is continuous in its data. Since X and Y are convex and compact, r(y*), 
leDi b\= E bfyf,
/eD, Let the optimal solution be (r{y*), s* t ..., s$). Let S* be the set of N two-person zero-sum games such that zth game has as its payoff matrix, Qf = { qf } (i = 1, . . ., N) where
LEMMA 1 : The stationary strategy y* is optimal for Player II in the set S* such that y f is optimal in the ith game which is of two-person zero-sum type and whose pay-off matrix isQf (i = 1, ..., JV). Further, the value ofeach game in the set S* is zero.
Proof: The optimal solution (r(y*), sf, ..., s$) for NMRDP with a\, b \ and p\j given in (6), (7) and (8) 
keDi leDt jeS
Suppose y* is not optimal in the set S*. Then there is at least one payoff matrix Q% in which y h is optimal instead of y *, so that for the corresponding game,
JteCfc teD h jeS
Now consider Player II being fixed at strategy
y=(y*> y*> •••> y*-i> y* y$)
and an NMRDP with respect to player / solved with the corresponding coefficients a~\, b\ and p\ (keC it ij e S) obtained in a manner similar to (6), (7), (8) with y. Let its solution obtained from (2) be r (y), s t {i = 1, . . . f JV). It is obvious that {r{y*)> sf, . ..,sjj) is feasible for this new program but not optimal since (11) would violate the condition for optimality. Hence r(y)<r{y*)> which contradicts y* being optimal, Thus, y f is optimal in the ith game whose payoff matrix is Qf(i=l, .
•., N). From (10), it follows then that the value of each game in the set S* is zero.
Similar results can be established by fixing Player ƒ at x, where x corresponds to r(x) = Max Minrjx, y).
Suppose Player I is fixed at x and NMRDP corresponding to Player II is solved and the optimal solution is (r(x), s 1 , $ 2 , .. ., s N ) .
A set S of N 2-person zero-sum games is defmed such that the ith game has as its payoff matrix Q t = { qf } where je S Then, x is optimal for Player I in the set S such that x t is optimal in the zth game whose payoff matrix is Q t and the value of each game in the set S is zero. 
Proof: It is easy to see that r{y*)^r(x).
Corresponding to N 2-person zero-sum games in set S*,
Similarly corresponding to games in set S,
Consider the non-terminating stochastic game (NSG) F* in which the payoff matrices are [A i -r(y*)B i ](i=l, ..., N). The alternatives of actions for the players and the transition probabilities are as already defmed for the NSRG. Hoffman and Karp [3] have shown the existence of stationary optimal stratégies for the players in the NSG and that the value is unique. Recalling the characterization of solution in Hoffman and Karp [3] , if g* dénotes the value of the game F*, (13) indicates that the parameter r (j/*) has been selected such that the value #* = 0. Fr om lemma 1, y* is optimal for Player // in game F*.
It can be seen similarly that if f dénotes another NSG in which the payoff matrices are [A t -r (x) B J (z = 1, . .., N) and g is its value, then from (14), g -0 and x is optimal for Player I in the game f. Now suppose r(y*)>r(x) then since Bi>0, element-by-element i=l, ... ( N (15) and the values of the corresponding NSG'sF* and f would imply, 9*<ê.
which contradicts the relationship developed from (13) and (14) above. Hence, r(y*) = r(x)
Let the common value of r(y*) and r(x) and r(x) be denoted by r*, then r(x, y*)^r(y*) = r* and r{x, y*)^r(x) = r*. Therefore, r(jc, y*) = r*
Substituting the common value r* for r(y*) and r(x) in (13) and (14) respectively shows that sf-Si = C } a constant for i = l, ..., AT. 
where r* = r(x, /*).
Thus, from (21) and (22) it can be seen that r a (t, y*)gr(jc, y*)^r a (x, u), for all terandwGÏ7 (23) which establishes that the pair (x, y*) is optimal among all the stratégies (T, U), r* is unique and that it is independent of the mitial probability vector a. 
where r* is unique and one of the s f (say s$) is set to zero. The stationary optimal stratégies (x*, y*) are composed of the optimal stratégies (x?, y f) in the respective games
The above characterization leads to a convergent algorithm for Computing the solution and this is presented in the following section.
A CONVERGENT ALGORITHM
Step 0: Set itération rc = 0 and fix Player // at a stationary strategy,)'
(O) .
Step 1: Using stationary strategy y {n) for Player II, fmd an unique solution r {n) , s<.
n >(i=l, 2,\ .., N) of the system, Max and,
by using the policy itération algorithm by Fox [2] for the NMRDP.
Step 2: Solve the N two-person zero-sum games whose element in the (k, l) position of the payoff matrix of fth game is | (29) to obtain the optimal stratégies x[ n + 1) , y\ h + 1) and the unique values #-n+1) for z=l, 2, ..., N.
Set and,
Step 3: If ^B +1) = i, then the solution of NSRGis given by x* =x in+ x \ 3;* = y (» + D and r* = r (n) . Stop.
If gr ( ." +1)^O for at least one state, then go to step 1 with n <-n+1.
, y (n) and r*"" 1 * form the the solution of the NSRG since the characterization given by (26) is satisfied.
If however g\ n)^0 for at least one state i, then the foliowing theorem shows that r (n) obtamed at the next itération is a lower value then the current value, r (n~L) , and it leads to convergence. vol. 14, n° 1, février 1980 In view ofthe non-optimality ofthe current solution, ö?; n)< 0 for at least one state i. Therefore, the optimal value r in} of the program (32)-(35) has to be smaller than the feasible value r ( "" 1} , Thus r w<r ( "-1 >
and it is bounded by r* as shown in theorem 1. A similar proof would hold if the algorithm is stated fixing Player / instead of Player II but the séquence r (n) will be a monotonically increasing one bounded from above by r*. It may be noticed that the above alogithm and the convergence proof have some similarity to those of Hoffman and Karp [3] for the case of NSG.
